|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Free Newsletters
Archive
My Subscriptions
News by Subject
News by Disease
News by Date
PLoS
Search News
Post Your News
JoVE
Job Seeker Login
Most Recent Jobs
Browse Biotech Jobs
Search Jobs
Post Resume
Career Fairs
Career Resources
For Employers
Regional News
US & Canada
Biotech Bay
Biotech Beach
Genetown
Pharm Country
BioCapital
BioMidwest
Bio NC
BioForest
Southern Pharm
BioCanada East
US Device
Europe
Asia
Market Summary
News
IPOs
Company Profiles
Companies
Events
Research Store
Biotech Events
Post an Event
Real Estate
Business Opportunities
|
|
|
|
PLoS By Category | Recent
PLoS Articles
|
|
Computer Science - Neuroscience - Physics
|
Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions
Published:
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Author:
Filippo Radicchi et al.
by Filippo Radicchi, Andrea Baronchelli, Luís A. N. Amaral
Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.
More...
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|